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The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the 
Legality of Internships in the Face of Conflicting Tests 
Interpreting the FLSA 
MADIHA M. MALIK 
Unpaid internships have come under increased scrutiny for their 
potential illegality under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Due to the 
limited case law and statutory guidance regarding interns, lower 
courts have issued conflicting opinions on the proper analysis courts 
should engage in to determine whether interns are considered 
“employees” under federal law. Such conflicting judicial 
interpretation is detrimental to both employers and interns. A bright 
line rule for determining when an intern qualifies as an employee 
under the FLSA is critical to settling the uncertainty in this area of 
the law.   
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The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the 
Legality of Internships in the Face of Conflicting Tests 
Interpreting the FLSA 
MADIHA M. MALIK 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
For years, emerging professionals have coveted the opportunity to 
expand their experiences, résumés, and networks with the help of 
internships. While the work is often unpaid, it is undertaken with the 
presumption that the opportunity will serve as a stepping-stone to their 
prospective careers. However, recent lawsuits have brought the legality of 
unpaid internships under scrutiny. In response to a slew of class action 
lawsuits filed by former and current interns, courts have had to consider 
whether interns fall within the category of “employee” under federal and 
state labor laws, and as such, must be paid according to minimum wage 
laws.1 Three areas of the law currently govern employment jurisprudence 
for interns: the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the FLSA, and the Department of Labor’s Wage and 
Hour Division (WHD) interpretive guidelines.2 These statutes and the 
cases that interpret them have fallen short of providing a clear test for 
courts and businesses to uniformly use in determining whether an intern is 
an employee under federal labor laws.  
The FLSA is the federal law that regulates wage and hour requirements 
for employees and mandates that employees be paid at least the federal 
minimum wage.3 The text of the FLSA is unhelpful in determining whether 
an intern is an “employee” because the Act does not mention interns and 
                                                                                                                          
 J.D. Candidate, The University of Connecticut School of Law, expected May 2016; B.A., The 
George Washington University, 2011. Thank you to my family for their unwavering support and 
encouragement, and to Professor Jon Bauer for his invaluable guidance. 
1 See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(involving plaintiff interns bringing suit claiming they were “employees” under the FLSA and entitled 
to compensation); Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving plaintiff 
interns claiming that they were entitled to minimum wage compensation as “employees” under the 
FLSA).   
2 Bernice Bird, Preventing Employer Misclassification of Student Interns and Trainees, CORNELL 
HR REV. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.cornellhrreview.org/preventing-employer-misclassification-of-
student-interns-and-trainees/#_edn1. 
3 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012).  
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provides an inadequate and broad definition of “employee.”4 In 1947, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the FLSA in Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Company,5 which presented the question of whether “trainees” for a 
railroad company were employees entitled to compensation.6 While the 
Court found that the “trainees” were not employees under the FLSA, it 
failed to establish a clear standard for analyzing whether an individual falls 
within the definition of an “employee.”7 In 2010, the WHD issued 
guidance in the form of a Six-Factor Test derived from Walling, designed 
for employers to use in order to determine whether interns in a particular 
program should be treated as employees and thus entitled to the minimum 
wage.8 While the Six-Factor Test provides some guidance, the agency’s 
interpretation lacks the force of law and is not binding on federal courts.9 
As such, courts have given varying weight to the WHD’s guidance, with 
some courts disregarding it all together.10  
Ambiguous statutory language, unclear legal precedent, and non-
binding agency interpretation have resulted in courts’ applying inconsistent 
standards to determine the employment status of interns. The emerging 
tests are only controlling in the jurisdiction in which the respective federal 
court sits, resulting in a patchwork of standards in courts across the nation. 
Such inconsistency of legal standards across jurisdictions inhibits 
multinational employers and courts from adequately assessing the legality 
of unpaid internships and elucidates the need for a uniformly controlling 
standard nationwide.  
This Note discusses and critiques the limited guidance available 
pursuant to the FLSA, the Supreme Court, and the WHD, as well as the 
various legal tests that have emerged from their interpretations. It suggests 
a test that courts, employers, and interns alike can apply in order to predict 
                                                                                                                          
4 See Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 492 (“[T]he term ‘intern’ is neither defined nor provided as an 
exception in the FLSA . . . .”); infra Part III.A.. 
5 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
6 Id. at 150. 
7 Id. at 153; compare Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(deferring to the DOL’s Six-Factor Test in determining the employment status of trainees), with Solis 
v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing the DOL’s Six-
Factor Test as inadequate for determining the employee status of trainees), and Reich v. Parker Fire 
Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding the DOL’s Six-Factor Test relevant but not 
conclusive to determining a trainee’s employment status under the FLSA).  
8 WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm 
[hereinafter DOL FACT SHEET]. 
9 See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that agency interpretations in 
formats such as opinion letters are entitled to deference, but only if they are persuasive); Hoyt v. Gen. 
Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that the federal courts of appeal were not bound by 
explanatory bulletins promulgated by the WHD). 
10 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the varied deference courts have afforded the WHD’s 
interpretation of the FLSA as it relates to interns).  
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the legality of unpaid internship programs. Part II provides an overview of 
the market for interns and its evolution as it relates to both employers and 
interns. Part III discusses the legal standards established by the FLSA, the 
Supreme Court, and the WHD. Part IV sets out the conflicting tests that 
have emerged from federal court decisions. Part V introduces two recently 
litigated cases that are soon to be considered by the Second Circuit and 
compares the courts’ distinct reasoning and decision in each case. Part VI 
analyzes the ways in which courts can overcome the ambiguity of the law 
and proposes several factors that should be taken into consideration in 
formulating a workable solution. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNSHIP MARKET 
High unemployment rates for recent college graduates have led to a 
hyper-competitive job market, causing internships to become a highly 
coveted way of getting one’s foot in the door.11 Internships provide real-
world skills different from knowledge obtained in the classroom, making 
graduates with internship experience more valuable candidates.12 Not only 
do internships provide experience in particular areas of interest, they also 
help develop “soft skills” such as communication and teamwork, which are 
highly valuable to employers.13 Unpaid internships are particularly 
desirable in fields where barriers of entry are particularly high and paid 
internships are rare, including industries such as entertainment, public 
relations, and publishing.14 Internships at times provide the prospect of a 
                                                                                                                          
11 PEW RESEARCH CTR., YOUNG, UNDEREMPLOYED AND OPTIMISTIC: COMING OF AGE SLOWLY, 
IN A TOUGH ECONOMY 6 (2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/young-underemployed-
and-optimistic.pdf (reporting that 54.3% of employed young adults between ages 18 to 24 were 
employed in 2011, the lowest total since 1948, when the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics first started 
collecting this data). Contributing to the competitive job market, the Pew Research Center reports that 
more young adults are enrolled in high school or college today than at any time before in history and 
that the job losses experienced in the aftermath of the Great Recession have compounded the 
decreasing employment rate. Id. at 3, 6.  
12 See Solis, 642 F.3d at 531–32 (placing special emphasis on intangible benefits interns derived 
from the work, which taught them responsibility, the dignity of manual labor, the importance of 
working hard, seeing a task through to completion, leadership skills, worth ethic, and other practical 
skills); Jack Gault et al., Undergraduate Business Internships and Career Success: Are They Related?, 
22 J. MARKETING EDUC. 45, 51 (2000) (stating that internship programs add real-world experience to 
their education); see also infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the importance given to intangible skills in 
assessing the benefits conferred to interns).  
13 See Catherine Gewertz, ‘Soft Skills’ in Big Demand, EDUC. WK., June 2007, at 25, available at 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/06/12/40soft.h26.html (stating that it is not enough to be 
academically strong because business leaders are increasingly valuing soft skills). Such intangible skills 
have received attention in recent case law and are deemed to have significant value in assessing the 
benefits derived from an internship. Solis, 642 F.3d at 531. 
14 See Christopher Keleher, The Perils of Unpaid Internships, 101 ILL. B.J. 626, 627 (2013) 
(listing industries where unpaid internships provide opportunities to learn and network); see also Eric 
Gardner, How All Those Intern Lawsuits Are Changing Hollywood, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 16, 
2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/how-all-intern-lawsuits-are-746945 (quoting Rick 
 
 1188 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1183 
full-time job at the end of the program.15 Employers also benefit from 
unpaid interns because internship programs often serve as an important 
pipeline feeding full-time hiring programs.16 Not only do interns provide 
employers with a new and young perspective, employers benefit from 
having time to train and get to know potential new hires before extending a 
full-time offer, a practice that is known as “converting interns.”17 
Disparities exist between paid and unpaid internships that result in 
unpaid interns being overlooked for full-time jobs and being assigned 
menial tasks as compared to their paid counterparts.18 Menial tasks that 
provide few professional skills and appear closer to unpaid labor, rather 
than meaningful learning opportunities, are largely the focus of disgruntled 
interns who claim they have been exploited.19 Unpaid internships have also 
been criticized for diluting the labor market, thereby replacing experienced 
workers and hurting the U.S. economy.20 Finally, access to unpaid 
                                                                                                                          
Levy, partner and general counsel of at talent agency, ICM Partners, which was defending a class 
action lawsuit brought by former interns, as stating “[t]here is a long, long tradition of intern programs 
being an integral part of careers in Hollywood”); Generation i, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2014,  
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21615612-temporary-unregulated-and-often-unpaid-
internship-has-become-route (stating that those employers most eager to provide unpaid internships are 
those who are glamorous enough for students to agree to perform menial work without pay).  
15 See, e.g., Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Hearst made it clear 
that there was little likelihood, and certainly no guarantee, of a job at the end of their internship.”).  
16 See NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, INTENSHIPS: CURRENT BENCHMARKS, 
http://www.naceweb.org/internships/benchmarks.aspx (reporting that 79% of interns accepted full-time 
job offers with the employers they held an internship with); see also David L. Gregory, The 
Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
227, 241 (1998) (“Internships benefit employers in a myriad of ways; they provide free labor, fresh 
perspectives, and a means to screen potential employees.”).  
17 See generally Philip S. Rose et al., Converting Interns into Regular Employees: The Role of 
Intern-Supervisor Exchange, 84 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 155 (2014) (studying the predictors of intern 
conversion). 
18 See NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, CLASS OF 2012: 60 PERCENT OF PAID INTERNS GOT 
JOB OFFERS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.naceweb.org/s08012012/paid-intern-job-offer (reporting that 
64% of paid interns received job offers compared to 38.3% of unpaid interns). Paid interns spend 42% 
of their time on professional duties such as analysis and project management and only 25% on clerical 
and non-essential functions, compared to unpaid interns who spend 30% of their time on professional 
tasks and 31% of their time on clerical work. Id. The study suggests that this discrepancy between 
unpaid and paid interns contributes to the disparity in job offers, with paid interns spending more time 
engaging in “real work,” therefore gaining more relevant and valuable experiences than their unpaid 
counterparts. Id.  
19 See, e.g., Questioning the Ethics of Unpaid Internships, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 13, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128490886 (relaying the story of an NYU 
student who, during an internship at an animation studio in New York City, was assigned to the 
facilities department and carried out tasks including cleaning the kitchen and the bathrooms, and 
cleaning doorknobs to prevent spreading of the H1N1 virus). 
20 ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE 
NEW ECONOMY 71 (2012) (stating that the internship boom has most seriously effected the 
displacement of regular employees, causing hundreds of thousands of full time, regular employees to 
be laid off and potentially remain unemployed). 
 2015] THE LEGAL VOID OF UNPAID INTERNSHIPS     1189 
internships is limited largely to those who can afford to take on unpaid 
work, a luxury that is often unavailable to low-income students, making 
them less competitive than their more affluent peers.21  
III.  UNCLEAR LEGAL STANDARDS 
The FLSA is the primary federal law regulating wages and hours for 
employees, and is enforced by the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour 
Division.22 Among other things, the FLSA mandates that employees be 
paid at least the federally prescribed minimum wage.23 Since the FLSA 
does not define or reference unpaid internships, their legality turns on the 
Act’s definition of “employee.”24 If an intern, by virtue of his or her job 
duties, does not meet the definition of “employee” under the FLSA, the 
Act does not apply and the employer does not have to abide by federal 
minimum wage requirements. However, if the intern does qualify as an 
“employee,” the employer must comply with the FLSA’s minimum wage 
and overtime provisions.25 As discussed below, determining whether an 
intern is an “employee” under the FLSA is challenging given the broad 
language of the statute, unclear judicial interpretation, and non-binding 
agency guidance.   
A.  Statutory Language 
The FLSA defines the term “employee” broadly as “any individual 
employed by an employer.”26 The definition of “employer” is “any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee.”27 The term “employ” is defined as “to suffer or permit to 
work.”28 These expansive definitions were read by the Supreme Court to 
be comprehensive enough to include an array of working relationships.29  
The broad definition of “employee” and “employ” has resulted in the 
                                                                                                                          
21 KATHRYN ANNE EDWARDS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, ECON. POL’Y INST.,  NOT-SO-
EQUAL PROTECTION-REFORMING THE REGULATION OF STUDENT INTERNSHIPS, 3 (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/pm160 (reporting that the decision to take an unpaid internship depends 
on a student’s “economic means, thus institutionalizing socioeconomic disparities beyond college”).  
22 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–02, 204 (2012) (stating that Congress 
created the Wage and Hour Division, under the direction of the Administrator, within the DOL to 
administer and enforce the FLSA); WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION LETTER FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (May 24, 1994), 1994 WL 1004829; WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.dol.gov/whd/about/mission/whdmiss.htm. 
23 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947). 
24 See Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he term ‘intern’ is 
neither defined nor provided as an exception in the FLSA . . . .”).  
25 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
26 Id. § 203(e)(1). 
27 Id. § 203(d). 
28 Id. § 203(g). 
29 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947). 
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Supreme Court loosely interpreting both terms,30 providing little guidance 
regarding how they apply in the context of internships. The Court has 
found the Act’s definition of “employ” to enlarge the meaning of 
“employee,” thereby providing coverage for parties who might not 
otherwise qualify as employees under a strict application of traditional 
principles of agency law.31 Various tests have been developed to determine 
the employment status of individuals under the FLSA depending on the 
context in which the question of employment arises, for example with 
regard to migrant workers32 and independent contractors.33 However a 
uniform test for determining the employment status of interns under the 
FLSA has yet to be developed.  
B.  Judicial Interpretation of Walling 
The primary source of judicial interpretation for the term “employee” 
in the internship context comes from Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Company,34 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the rights of trainees 
under the FLSA.35 The Court’s ruling in Walling gave rise to the 
foundational concept that someone who is trying to learn the skills 
necessary to perform the required functions of a job need not be treated as 
an employee.36 This holding has been extended to interns who are, for 
purposes of the FLSA, treated similar to “trainees.”37 
                                                                                                                          
30 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (stating that the term 
“employ” has “striking breadth” in the FLSA).  
31 Id.  
32 See Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117–20 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that migrant pickle 
harvesters were not “employees” under the FLSA and analyzing the potential employment relationship 
with factors including the permanency of the relationship, the degree of skill required, the workers’ 
capital investment, the migrant workers’ opportunity for profit or loss, and the potential employer’s 
degree of control). 
33 In distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, courts focus on “whether, as 
a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is 
instead in business for himself.” Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008); see 
also Scantland v. Jeffrey Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that when 
determining whether an individual is an “employee” or an “independent contractor” exempt from the 
FLSA, courts look to the “economic reality” of the relationship between the alleged employee and 
employer and whether the relationship exhibits dependence); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 
1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the dominant factor in considering whether an individual is an 
independent contractor or an employee, is the degree of economic dependence that the alleged 
employee has on the business for which he or she is working).  
34 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
35 See id. at 153 (holding that the trainees were not “employees” under the FLSA).  
36 Stephen A. Mazurak, The Unpaid Intern: Liability for the Uninformed Employer, 29 A.B.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 101, 105 (2013). 
37 See Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to 
Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1369 n.30 (2012) (“The 
DOL practically adopted the trainee standard verbatim—only changing ‘training’ to ‘internship’ and 
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In Walling, the employer railroad company required prospective hires, 
or “trainees,” for the position of brakeman to undergo preliminary training 
that lasted an average of seven to eight days.38 The Supreme Court held 
that the trainees were not employees under the FLSA and were not entitled 
to wages.39 In so holding, the Court reasoned that working for one’s own 
advantage on another’s premises, without an express or implied 
compensation agreement, did not automatically make an individual an 
employee under the FLSA.40 Under this reasoning, interns who have no 
expectation of compensation and work without pay for some other personal 
benefit, such as building their résumés or networking, cannot automatically 
claim to be employees within the scope of the FLSA.   
The Walling Court found several factors relevant to its holding.41 First, 
the Court noted that the trainees did not replace regular paid employees; 
rather the regular employees did most of the work themselves, and stood 
by to supervise the trainees.42 As such, the company did not benefit from 
the trainees’ work because the trainees, rather than facilitating the 
company’s business, at times impeded it.43 Second, the Court found it 
significant that the defendant railroad company did not compensate the 
trainees, nor did the trainees expect any compensation during the training 
period.44  
The Court concluded that the employer railroad received no 
“immediate advantage” from the trainees’ work, and therefore the trainees 
were not “employees” under the FLSA.45 In cautioning that its holding in 
                                                                                                                          
‘trainee’ to ‘intern.’”); DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (adopting Walling in formulating a guideline for 
the legality of unpaid internships under the FLSA). 
38 Walling, 330 U.S. at 149. 
39 Id. at 153. 
40 See id. at 152 (“The definition ‘suffer or permit to work’ was obviously not intended to stamp 
all persons as employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for 
their own advantage on the premises of another.”).  
41 These factors were later adopted in the Department of Labor’s Six-Factor Test, infra Part III.C. 
See DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (listing the criteria to be applied in determining whether an 
individual is entitled to compensation or not). 
42 Walling, 330 U.S. at 149–50. The yard crew would instruct the trainees, providing supervision 
by first allowing them to observe routine activities and gradually allowing trainees to do actual work 
under close scrutiny. Id. at 149. 
43 Id. at 150. 
44 Id. Those who passed the training were certified as competent and subsequently placed in a 
pool of qualified workers available when the railroad company needed them. Id. Pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement, it was agreed that for the war period, the men who would later work 
for the railroad company would be given a retroactive allowance of $4 per day for the training period. 
Id. 
45 Id. at 153. The Court’s analysis of the “immediate advantage” received by the employer has led 
many courts to infer that this was the primary test established by the Supreme Court in employer-
trainee jurisprudence, despite the Court’s failure to formulate a bright-line test. See, e.g., Kaplan v. 
Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Walling for the 
proposition that when an individual’s work “provides no ‘immediate advantage’ for his alleged 
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Walling might provide a way to evade FLSA minimum wage 
requirements,46 the Court’s decision alludes to the recent claims of 
employers unjustly categorizing employees as “interns” to bypass the 
FLSA. While Walling did not present an issue of employers evading the 
FLSA by employing beginners at less than minimum wage, the Court 
noted that, “[i]t will be time enough to pass upon such evasions when it is 
contended that they have occurred.”47 Such a time is upon us with the 
current question of whether modern unpaid internships are legal under the 
FLSA.  
C.  Administrative Guidance 
Following the 2008 recession, the economy saw a dramatic increase in 
the number of unpaid internships,48 prompting guidance for employers 
from the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) on how 
to properly handle the growing number of interns.49 In 2010, drawing from 
the Court’s decision in Walling,50 the WHD issued a test that employers 
were urged to use to determine whether hiring an intern without 
compensation was legal under the FLSA.51 The DOL’s Six-Factor Test52 
requires that in order for an unpaid internship to be considered lawful  
under the FLSA: 
                                                                                                                          
‘employer’—he is not an ‘employee’ under the FLSA”); Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 
1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The rationale of [Walling] would seem to be that the railroad received no 
‘immediate advantage’ from the trainees’ services.”). 
46 See Walling, 330 U.S. at 153 (“We have not ignored the argument that such a holding may open 
up a way for evasion of the law.”).  
47 Id.  
48 Josh Sanburn, The Beginning of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME (May 2, 2012), 
http://business.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-unpaid-internship-as-we-know-
it/. Unpaid internships began to increase in the 1970’s and 1980’s when the traditional norm of working 
at one job for life was being moved away from and the development of human resources departments 
allowed specialization of overseeing new hires and recruits, including interns. Id. The “Great 
Recession” accelerated the increase of unpaid interns, and as of 2012, of the 1.5 million internships in 
the United States, an estimated one-third to one-half are unpaid. Id.; see also supra Part II (discussing 
the economy’s impact on the modern-day internship market).  
49 Gregory S. Bergman, Unpaid Internships: A Tale of Legal Dissonance, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 551, 564 (2014). 
50 WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FLSA2004-5NA, OPINION LETTER FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (May 17, 2004), 2004 WL 5303033. 
51 DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. These guidelines apply only to for-profit employers. Non-
profit employers are exempt from the criteria for unpaid internships and may hire unpaid interns as 
volunteers without meeting the DOL’s requirements. Id. In 1996, prior to the publication of the DOL 
Fact Sheet, the WHD articulated similar guidance in an opinion letter responding to an inquiry 
regarding the FLSA’s application to interns. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION 
LETTER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), 1996 WL 1031777 (May 8, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 
OPINION LETTER]. 
52 This test is sometimes referred to as the “Walling Factors.” See, e.g., Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 
715 F. Supp. 2d 378, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation 
of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training 
which would be given in an educational environment; 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but 
works under close supervision of existing staff; 
4. The employer that provides the training derives no 
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern; 
and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; 
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the 
conclusion of the internship; and 
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is 
not entitled to wages for the time spent in the 
internship.53 
“If all of the factors of the test are met, an employment relationship 
does not exist under the FLSA, and the Act’s minimum wage and overtime 
provisions do not apply to the intern.”54 The WHD advises that the more an 
internship program is structured away from the employer’s actual 
operations, such as providing an academic experience or skills pertaining 
to several employment settings, the more likely it is to be viewed as non-
paid work, acceptable for an unpaid internship.55 The WHD further 
explains that interns engaging in productive work, such as clerical tasks or 
other business operations, may still be viewed as “employees” entitled to 
wages and overtime because the employer benefits from the interns’ work, 
even if the interns are learning new skills.56  
Though the Six-Factor Test is useful, the WHD’s guidelines are merely 
discretionary, and courts are not bound by them.57 Despite the language in 
the Fact Sheet suggesting that all six factors be strictly construed in every 
case,58 recent lower court decisions have afforded varying degrees of 
                                                                                                                          
53 DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. 
54 Id.  
55 See id. (stating that the more an internship program is structured around a classroom or 
academic experience, the more likely the internship will be viewed as an extension of the individual’s 
educational experience, and the more the internship program provides skills used in several 
employment settings, the intern will most likely be viewed as receiving training). 
56 Id. 
57 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[I]nterpretations contained in formats 
such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore, but only to the extent 
that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944))); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing judicial deference to agency regulations and 
interpretations of law).  
58 See DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (“If all of the factors listed above are met, an employment 
relationship does not exist under the FLSA . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
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deference to the DOL’s Six-Factor Test, frequently discarding the agency’s 
guidance and creating their own tests to determine when an unpaid intern is 
an “employee.”59 The DOL Fact Sheet contributes to the confusion with its 
introductory language: “whether an internship or training program meets 
this exclusion depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each such 
program,”60 suggesting a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, which 
seems to be at odds with applying each part of the DOL Six-Factor Test.61 
Two recent cases filed by unpaid interns in the Southern District of New 
York, Wang v. Hearst Corporation62 and Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, 
Inc.63 discussed below,64 and the different tests used in each case, illustrate 
the need to reconcile the standard for future cases. 
IV.  AGENCY DEFERENCE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF WALLING 
 The DOL’s Six-Factor Test has been widely criticized as being 
confusing and contradictory; some courts have disregarded the test entirely 
when analyzing the existence of employment relationships.65 Application 
of the criteria is viewed as being challenging, difficult to prove, and highly 
subjective.66 The Sixth Circuit stated: 
[w]e find the WHD’s test to be a poor method for 
determining employee status in a training or educational 
setting. For starters, it is overly rigid and inconsistent with a 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271–72 (5th Cir. 1982) (referencing other 
courts’ attempts to develop tests directly from the language of the Court’s opinion in Walling); see also 
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (drawing from a Tenth Circuit 
case distinguishing an independent contractor and employee, concluding that the totality of 
circumstances test was proper and that meeting five of the six DOL factors was sufficient to find that 
there was no employment relationship); Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787–88 (4th Cir. 1964) 
(formulating three criteria including displacement of regular workers, whether the trainee was working 
solely for his or her own benefit, and whether the company benefited from the trainee’s work); infra 
Part IV.C (discussing the lack of agency deference by courts and judicial application of several tests 
including the totality of circumstances test, the primary benefit test, and the immediate advantage test, 
all drawn from Walling).  
60 DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
61 Cf. Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (remarking on the confusion 
produced by the language in the DOL Fact Sheet).  
62 293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
63 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
64 See infra Part V (discussing Wang and Glatt at length). 
65 See Jason A. Cabrera & Sarah A. Kelly, Unpaid Internships: Training Ground or Legal 
Landmine?, LAB. & EMP. OBSERVER (Cozen O’Connor), 2013, at 5, available at http://www.cozen.com 
/Templates/media/files/LE_Observer1213.pdf (identifying the paradox that giving interns meaningful 
work creates potential liability because the employer receives an immediate advantage from the intern’s 
work while assigning menial tasks means putting the employer at risk of its actions being interpreted as 
providing training similar to that given in an educational environment and displacing regular 
employees). 
66 Mazurak, supra note 36, at 103. 
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totality-of-the-circumstances approach, where no one fact 
controls . . . . Furthermore, the test is inconsistent with 
[Walling] itself. . . . While the . . . six factors may be helpful 
in guiding that inquiry, the . . . test on the whole is not.67 
 
Despite criticism regarding the application of the DOL Six-Factor 
Test, courts should give some deference to the DOL Fact Sheet, by virtue 
of its publication by the WHD, the administrative agency that regulates the 
FLSA.68   
A.  DOL Six-Factor Test Under Skidmore Deference 
The Supreme Court has established that informal agency guidelines are 
entitled to deference “only to the extent that [they] have the power to 
persuade.”69 The persuasive power of a given guideline depends on “the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
[and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”70 
The DOL Fact Sheet was issued by the WHD as an interpretive 
guideline in response to requests from employers asking for clarification of 
minimum wage requirements for unpaid internships.71 One of the WHD’s 
functions is to issue non-binding bulletins and opinions interpreting the 
FLSA.72 Courts have viewed DOL Fact Sheets as informal interpretations 
subject to Skidmore73 deference, and therefore are only to be considered if 
they are determined to be “persuasive.”74 The Supreme Court affirmed this 
                                                                                                                          
67 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal 
citations omitted). 
68 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that an administrative agency’s 
policies are entitled to respect).  
69 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
70 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. 
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (analyzing whether an agency’s interpretation applied technical 
expertise on a complex matter with agency jurisdiction); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 
(1976) (analyzing whether the agency’s interpretation was consistent with earlier agency 
pronouncements); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971) (analyzing whether an agency’s 
decision was well-reasoned). 
71 See WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, RULINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (explaining that opinion letters are “in response to fact-
specific requests submitted by individuals and organizations”); see, e.g., 1996 OPINION LETTER, supra 
note 51, at *1 (responding to an inquiry regarding application of the FLSA to interns).  
72 Keleher, supra note 14, at 628.  
73 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
74 Id. at 140; see Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1025–26 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(applying the less deferential Skidmore standard to DOL Fact Sheet #71); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 
(finding the WHD’s opinion letter unpersuasive, and therefore did not require deference); Wang v. 
Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Skidmore deference to DOL Fact 
Sheet #71).  
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position in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,75 a case where the 
Court afforded Skidmore deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the 
FLSA.76 
While deference to informal agency guidelines is not required, the 
Court has suggested that statutory interpretation in an opinion letter should 
be accorded some deference.77 In Skidmore, the Court held that an 
agency’s interpretation may merit some deference, whatever its form, 
given the “specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information” available to the agency,78 and given the value of uniformity in 
its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law 
requires.79 An argument can therefore be made that Skidmore deference 
should be afforded to the DOL Six-Factor Test, given the benefit of the 
specialized experience that the DOL’s WHD can bring to bear on the issue 
of defining internships within the FLSA.80 This argument, however, is 
weakened because the DOL Six-Factor Test merely restates the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Walling.81 Absent independent agency procedure and 
formal adjudication, the DOL Fact Sheet holds less persuasive force.82  
Though some have suggested that ambiguity regarding the 
employment status of interns should be resolved through agency 
                                                                                                                          
75 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
76 Id. at 2168–69. The Court rejected the contention that Auer deference was warranted, stating 
that such deference was only appropriate in cases where an agency’s interpretation is “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 2159 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
77 See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (finding that it was not persuaded by the opinion letter’s 
statutory interpretation). The Court differentiated between opinion letters, which are only compelling if 
they have they have the “‘power to persuade,’” from interpretations that result from formal 
adjudications or notice-and-comment rulemaking, which are afforded Chevron deference, mandating 
that the agency interpretation be accepted by courts if “reasonable.” Id. at 586–87. 
78 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
79 Id. at 140. 
80 See, e.g., Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997) (finding that 
reasonable agency interpretations have “at least some added persuasive force” where Chevron is 
inapplicable); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (affording “some deference” to an interpretive 
rule); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (stating that 
“some weight” is due to informal interpretations though not “the same deference as norms that derive 
from the exercise . . . of delegated lawmaking powers”).  
81 See Opinion Letters from the Administrator, FLSA2006-12 (April 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_04_06_12_FLSA.pdf (“Based on [Walling], the 
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has developed six factors to evaluate whether a trainee, intern, extern 
apprentice, graduate assistant, or similar individual is to be considered an employee.”).  
82 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (explaining that generally, 
Congress has intended to give “administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a 
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force,” and therefore, Chevron deference has mostly been applied to 
interpretations that resulted from formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking).  
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rulemaking,83 the limited deference courts have afforded to the DOL Six-
Factor Test indicates the lack of persuasive force that the current regulation 
has and that absent formal procedure, such a solution will likely be 
ineffective.84 Therefore, judicial interpretation for the FLSA at the 
appellate and Supreme Court level is required to provide clarity in this area 
of the law and to dissipate the current legal void of unpaid interns.  
B.  Judicial Treatment of the DOL Six-Factor Test 
Courts have afforded varying deferential weight to the DOL’s Six-
Factor Test.85 Along with expressly rejecting reliance on the DOL Six-
Factor Test,86 circuits have disagreed about the proper test to apply in order 
to determine whether an internship qualifies for the “trainee” exception 
established by Walling.   
In Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District,87 the Tenth Circuit 
addressed the trainee-employee distinction and held that the DOL factors 
were “relevant but not conclusive” when determining whether a trainee is 
an employee under the FLSA.88 In an action against a fire department for 
wages allegedly owed to firefighters training in an academy prior to being 
employed, the parties agreed that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test should be 
applied, but disagreed as to which factors were necessary to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                          
83 See Kimberlee McTorry, Death of Unpaid Internships, the Rise of Social Equality: Legality of 
Unpaid Internships Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 8 S.J. POL’Y & JUST. L.J. 47, 59–60 (2014) 
(suggesting that the FLSA be amended to provide an apprentice exception); Jessica L. Curiale, Note, 
America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need 
for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1553 (2010) (proposing rulemaking as the appropriate vehicle for 
establishing an “intern-learner” exception to the FLSA for unpaid interns); see also Keleher, supra note 
14, at 631 (proposing that the WHD revise the DOL’s Six-Factor Test to improve the test’s 
practicability by providing flexibility for different sizes of companies). Others have suggested that the 
Department of Education should be the agency regulating unpaid internships, instead of the Department 
of Labor. See Patricia L. Reid, Fact Sheet #71: Shortchanging the Unpaid Academic Intern, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 1375, 1395 (2014) (suggesting that Congress should enact a law that delegates the power to 
regulate unpaid academic internships to the Department of Education). While the concept of shifting 
oversight to the Department of Education would align with the purpose of internships providing class 
credit, this approach disregards internships that are not taken to fulfill course credits, but are merely to 
gain experience and are not affiliated with an educational institution.  
84 See Bergman, supra note 49, at 583 (stating that an updated WHD standard will not solve the 
circuit split and will contribute to varying judicial interpretation, as well as suggesting instead that a 
Supreme Court opinion would “provide the authority necessary to unite the circuits” and provide 
guidance as to proper deference and analysis regarding the DOL Fact Sheet and the employment status 
of unpaid interns). 
85 See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Courts 
differ on whether the WHD’s test is entitled to controlling weight in determining employee status in a 
training context.”).  
86 See, e.g., id. at 525 (rejecting the DOL Six-Factor Test as being at odds with Walling’s totality 
of the circumstances and “primary beneficiary” standard).  
87 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).  
88 Id. at 1027. 
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test.89 While the Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the plaintiffs, argued that 
all criteria of the DOL Six-Factor Test must be met for the position to be 
lawfully unpaid, the defendant fire department urged that the proper test 
was the totality-of-the-circumstances, in which case it was not necessary 
for all six of the DOL’s criteria to be met.90 The court reasoned that agency 
regulations were not controlling on courts and that there was little support 
that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test should be strictly applied in an “all or 
nothing” approach.91 The Reich court concluded that the proper test was 
the totality-of-the-circumstances.92 The court found that although the 
trainees met five out of the six DOL criteria, this was insufficient to meet 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, thereby holding that the firefighters 
were not employees entitled to compensation.93  
In Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.,94 the Eleventh Circuit 
first considered “the ‘economic realities’ of the relationship,” viewing the 
DOL’s Six-Factor Test as a supplement to its analysis.95 Students in 
medical billing and coding programs who had worked at unpaid 
externships to meet graduation requirements alleged that they had received 
minimal educational benefit from their externships and that the employer 
benefited from their work.96 The court held that the employer received 
little, if any, economic benefit from the work, and therefore the student 
externs were not considered “employees” under the FLSA.97 The court 
further stated that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test supported its conclusion but 
was not controlling on courts.98 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Solis v. 
Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc.99 applied Skidmore deference to 
the DOL’s Six-Factor Test, stating that the factors were individually 
helpful in guiding the inquiry regarding the employment status of interns, 
but that the test as a whole was “a poor method for determining employee 
status.”100 
                                                                                                                          
89 Id. at 1025–26. 
90 Id. at 1026. 
91 Id. (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under [the 
FLSA], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” 
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
92 Id. at 1026–27. 
93 Id. at 1029 (concluding that a “single factor cannot carry the entire weight of an inquiry into the 
totality of the circumstances” and therefore the trainees were not employees under the FLSA).  
94 504 F. App’x. 831 (11th Cir. 2013). 
95 Id. at 834–35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. at 832–33 (citing repetitive work assignments and a lack of formal structure in the program). 
97 Id. at 834. 
98 Id. at 834–35. 
99 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011). 
100 Id. at 525 (stating that the test is unpersuasive, is inconsistent with Walling, and is a “poor 
method for determining employee status”). 
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Finally, in an outlier decision, Archie v. Grand Central Partnership,101 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
in an opinion by now-Supreme Court Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
that the DOL Fact Sheet is entitled to Chevron deference.102 In applying a 
mixed DOL Six-Factor Test and economic realities test, the court in Archie 
held that because the DOL’s Six-Factor Test and the findings in Walling 
take the same approach, the DOL’s Six-Factor Test is a reasonable 
application of the FLSA and Walling, and is therefore controlling.103  
C.  Tests Emerging from Federal Court Decisions 
As previously noted, federal courts have not agreed on a test with 
which to determine the employment status of interns. Four tests have 
emerged as a result of federal court jurisprudence: (1) the balancing benefit 
test; (2) the economic realities test; (3) the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test; and (4) the all-or-nothing DOL Six-Factor Test. Below is a discussion 
of each test, in turn.  
1.  Balancing Benefits: Immediate Advantage or Primary Benefit Test 
The primary benefit test originates from the second criterion of the 
DOL’s Six-Factor Test, which asks whether “[t]he internship experience is 
for the benefit of the intern.”104 The DOL further explains that if the intern 
benefits by deriving “skills that can be used in multiple employment 
settings, as opposed to skills particular to one employer’s operation,” it is 
more likely that the intern will be regarded as a trainee.105 However, even 
if the intern receives “some benefits in the form of a new skill or improved 
work habits,” he or she may still be found to be an employee if the work 
performed is largely clerical.106 
The majority of federal courts have held that an intern is not an 
employee unless the employer receives an immediate advantage or primary 
benefit from the intern’s work.107 The Fourth,108 Fifth,109 Sixth,110 Tenth,111 
                                                                                                                          
101 997 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  
102 Id. at 532. 
103 Id. at 531, 535. 
104 DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209–10 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the 
proper test is whether the alleged employer or workers “principally benefited” from the orientation 
program and that “[t]here [were] several facts that serve[d] to illustrate the relative degrees of benefit”); 
Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (stating that Walling applied 
an “immediate advantage” rationale, inquiring as to who was the principal beneficiary of the 
“seemingly employment relationship”); Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 330 F.2d 785, 788 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding 
it determinative that the employer’s interests were served by the workers and that the employer 
“benefited from their labors”).  
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and Eleventh112 Circuits have established that a balance of the benefits 
analysis is the proper test for determining whether student interns, externs, 
and trainees are employees under the FLSA.113   
The dispositive question in a balancing of benefits analysis is whether 
the intern or the employer was the primary beneficiary of the 
relationship.114 Lower court jurisprudence has introduced an additional 
consideration to the balancing of benefits analysis, namely that of tangible 
and intangible benefits, which some courts have taken into account to 
assess the benefits interns or alleged employees receive from performance 
of internship duties.115 The Solis court, for example, placed particular 
emphasis on the intangible benefits interns derived from their work, 
including learning important skills related to responsibility, strong work 
ethic, and leadership.116 Other federal courts have made similar 
determinations,117 concluding that intangible benefits are “significant 
enough to tip the scale of primary benefit in the students’ favor even where 
the [employer] receives tangible benefits from the students’ activities.”118 
                                                                                                                          
108 See McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209 (concluding that the proper test is whether the main 
beneficiary of the trainees’ labor is the employee or employer). 
109 See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he district court’s 
balancing [of relative benefits] analysis appears to us to be more appropriate.”).  
110 See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the existence of an employment relationship depends on “which party derives the primary benefit 
from the relationship”). 
111 See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A number of 
courts have . . . weigh[ed] the relative benefits to each party, and we are persuaded that conducting the 
inquiry in this fashion is both permissible and helpful.”). 
112 See Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(balancing the benefits to determine that two student externs were not employees because the training 
was similar to that which would be provided to them in school, was related to the workers’ course of 
study, and was a benefit to the students because they received academic credit for their work, thereby 
stratifying graduation requirements). 
113  See Solis, 642 F.3d at 529 (finding that the primary benefit test is the proper framework for 
determining employee status).  
114 Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 330 (2d Cir. 2012). Further, to determine who is the primary 
beneficiary of a relationship requires balancing of (a) the tangible and intangible benefits derived by the 
student, (b) the detriment to the employer, and (c) the benefit to the employer from the students’ 
activities. Solis, 642 F.3d at 526. 
115 See Solis, 642 F.3d at 531–32 (agreeing that the intangible benefits “are of significant value”). 
116 Id. at 531. 
117 See Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering 
intangible benefits along with other Walling factors. The court determined these intangible benefits to 
include aiding participants to obtain jobs after the experience and would teach basic job skills including 
timeliness, good attendance, working a full day, and punching a time clock). See also Kaplan, 504 F. 
App’x. at  834 (considering the educational value of hands-on-work, receiving academic credit, and 
that the externship made plaintiffs eligible for their degrees, along with several of the Walling factors); 
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (considering teamwork, responsibility, 
accomplishment and pride along with whether the work decreased costs for the employer). 
118 Solis, 420 F.3d at 532. The Solis court explained that the overall educational benefits, even if 
intangible, should be considered. Id. at 532. 
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Despite the application of the primary benefits test by circuit courts across 
the country, the test has been criticized as being difficult to apply because 
it is “subjective and unpredictable.”119  
2.  Economic Realities Test 
The “economic realities” test assesses factors “including whether a 
person’s work confers an economic benefit on the entity for whom they are 
working.”120 This test has been adopted by the Second,121 Fifth,122 
Eighth,123 Ninth,124 Tenth,125 and Eleventh126 Circuits. The Supreme Court 
also applied the economic realities test in Goldberg v. Whitaker House 
Coop., Inc.,127 where in assessing whether an employment relationship 
existed between a cooperative and its members, the Court analyzed the 
degree of control the alleged employer had over the workers, including 
management’s ability to hire and fire workers.128 However, in Goldberg, 
the Court avoided addressing the absolute use of the economic realities test 
by stating, “if the ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to 
be the test of employment, these homeworkers are employees.”129 Walling 
                                                                                                                          
119 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Under this 
[primary beneficiary] test, an employer could never know in advance whether it would be required to 
pay its interns. Such a standard is unmanageable.”). 
120 Kaplan, 504 F. App’x. at 834; see also Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 
470 (11th Cir. 1982) (“It is well established that the issue of whether an employment relationship exists 
under the FLSA must be judged by the ‘economic realities’ of the individual case.”).  
121 See Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing as common ground 
that courts must evaluate the “economic reality” when determining the existence of an employment 
relationship).  
122 See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1553 (5th Cir. 1990) (“For purposes of FLSA, 
determination of employee status focuses on economic reality and economic dependence.”); Usery v. 
Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that in determining employment 
status, economic realities are determinative).  
123 See Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In determining whether an entity 
functions as an individual’s employer, courts generally look to the economic reality of the 
arrangement.”). 
124 See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating 
that the economic reality test includes inquiries into four factors including whether the alleged 
employer has the power to hire and fire employees, supervises and controls employee work schedules 
or conditions of employment, determines the rate and method of payment, and maintains employment 
records).  
125 See Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the 
economic realities of the relationship govern the inquiry of employment status); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 
802, 804 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the economic realities of the relationship govern and the focal 
point is economic dependency on the business (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 322 U.S. 126, 130 
(1947))).  
126 See Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(applying the economic realities test); Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (analyzing the economic realities of an individual case).  
127 366 U.S. 28 (1961). 
128 Id. at 32–33 (holding that the workers were employees under the “economic reality” test). 
129 Id. at 33 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 1202 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1183 
modified the “economic realities” test when it stated that despite the 
economic realities of the relationship, when an individual works for his or 
her own purpose, particularly when the work provides no “immediate 
advantage” for his alleged employer, he or she is not an employee under 
the FLSA.130 
3.  Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test 
The totality-of-the-circumstances test originates from Walling and the 
DOL Fact Sheet.131 Despite a lack of express statutory or Supreme Court 
guidance regarding the applicability of the test, federal courts have 
repeatedly held that the totality-of-the-circumstances test determines the 
existence of an employment relationship.132  
In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,133 decided four months after 
Walling, the Supreme Court held that determining the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship does not depend on isolated factors, but 
rather on the circumstances of the activity “as a whole.”134 In its decision, 
the Court used the economic realities test as one of the factors in analyzing 
the totality-of-the-circumstances, suggesting a totality of the economic 
circumstances approach like the one proposed below.135 The majority of 
lower courts seem to have adopted a similar approach.136 Under the 
Rutherford standard, courts are required to look at all of the circumstances 
of an alleged employment relationship to determine whether an intern is an 
“employee” under the FLSA.  
                                                                                                                          
130 Kaplan, 504 F. App’x. at  834 n.1 (citing Walling’s explanation that the FLSA’s definition of 
“employee” cannot be interpreted to make someone serving his own interest an employee of someone 
who gives aid and instruction).  
131 The totality of the circumstances is not included as one of the factors in the DOL Six-Factor 
Test, but is in the language following the six criteria: “If all of the factors listed above are met, an 
employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA . . . .” DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. 
132 See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
the DOL Six-Factor Test is based on a totality of the circumstances approach). 
133 331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
134 Id. at 730.  
135 Id. (referencing the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the underlying economic realities 
supported its determination and stating, “[w]e think, however, that the determination of the relationship 
does not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”); 
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts will generally look to the 
“economic reality” of the arrangement); see infra Part VI.C (discussing the totality of the economic 
circumstances test as the appropriate test for intern-employee jurisprudence).  
136 See, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 330 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[E]conomic reality is 
determined based upon all the circumstances . . . .”); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 
F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting an approach that “bypasses any real consideration of the 
economic realities of the relationship and is antithetical to settled jurisprudence calling for 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances of each case”); Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027 (basing the 
court’s inquiry on the totality-of-the-circumstances test and the economic realities of the relationship); 
Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1326–27 (10th Cir. 1981) (following the totality-of-
circumstances standard of Rutherford).  
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4.  All-or-Nothing DOL Six-Factor Test 
A final All-or-Nothing Test has been suggested, requiring that each 
element of the DOL’s Six-Factor Test must be met in order for an intern to 
be exempt from “employee” status under the FLSA.137 While the language 
in the DOL Fact Sheet calls for this approach, most courts have discarded 
the all-or-nothing test in favor of a some-but-not-all-factors approach.138  
The varying tests used across the circuits to determine whether a 
trainee is an employee under the FLSA illustrates the lack of a uniform 
standard that employers and courts can readily implement to determine the 
legality of unpaid internship programs. Since the Walling decision in 1947, 
the Supreme Court has not issued a definitive rule to determine when an 
unpaid intern is in fact an employee. In light of the increasing litigation on 
the issue of unpaid interns, the economic changes that have taken place 
since Walling, and lower courts’ inability to clearly apply Walling when 
determining the employment status of interns, the need for a bright line 
rule has never been greater. 
V.  CASES ON APPEAL: WANG AND GLATT 
Responding to a recent flood of lawsuits filed by unpaid interns, a 
Second Circuit panel recently heard two cases concerning whether unpaid 
interns at Hearst Corporation and Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. qualify as 
employees under the FLSA, which would entitle them to back pay and 
potential damages. Both cases were heard separately by the Southern 
District of New York and were heard jointly on appeal by the Second 
Circuit.139 
A.  Wang v. Hearst Corporation  
The first of the cases on appeal, Wang v. Hearst Corporation,140 
involves a class of plaintiffs who brought action against the magazine-
publishing conglomerate, Hearst Corporation.141 The plaintiffs allege that 
they are “employees” under the FLSA and New York Labor Law 
(NYLL)142 and that they should have been compensated according to 
                                                                                                                          
137 Bird, supra note 2. 
138 See DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (stating that all six of the DOL factors must be applied 
when determining the legality of an unpaid internship); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing tests 
adopting some parts of the DOL Six-Factor Test while determining that others are less significant).  
139 Order Consolidating Appeals Dockets at 2, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 13-366 
(2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2013). 
140 293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
141 Id. at 490. 
142 Id. at 492. NYLL uses the same standard for employment as the FLSA. Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 
287 F.R.D. 251, 260 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
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minimum wage requirements.143 Named plaintiff Xuedan “Diana” Wang 
was a former Harper’s Bazaar intern who sought damages for five months 
of unpaid labor in the magazine’s accessories department.144 Wang and her 
co-plaintiffs145 worked as unpaid interns at several of Hearst’s magazines. 
Despite earning course credit, Wang said in a Huffington Post interview 
that the internship was far from an educational experience.146   
Wang reportedly worked forty to fifty-five hours a week as “head 
intern,” supervising several other unpaid interns carrying bags to and from 
PR firms and served as a messenger service for the magazine.147 Like many 
unpaid interns, Wang was pursuing her childhood dream of a career in the 
fashion industry at her favorite magazine.148 After completing the 
semester-long internship, Wang’s supervisor declined her request for a 
letter of recommendation, criticizing Wang for mistakes she had made 
during her time working for the magazine.149 After reading the DOL Fact 
Sheet, Wang reportedly realized that the magazine had been treating her 
and other unpaid interns inappropriately, prompting her to file suit.150   
At trial, the court found it important that the plaintiffs understood prior 
to their internship that the position was unpaid and that Hearst had 
conveyed that there was no guarantee that the internship would lead to a 
full-time job.151 While both parties agreed that the interns performed some 
duties that were similar to those of paid employees, Wang and Hearst 
disputed the amount of supervision provided to the interns and the benefits 
that Hearst derived from the interns.152   
The parties also disagreed as to the appropriate test for defining an 
“employee” under Walling.153 The plaintiffs sought partial summary 
                                                                                                                          
143 Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 490, 492 n.3 (explaining that circuit courts have held that the NYLL 
applies the same employment standard as the FLSA, and that while the court’s analysis was based on 
the FLSA, it is nonetheless applicable to the NYLL). 
144 Alice Hines, Fashion Week 2012: Unpaid Internships Questioned After Diana Wang’s 
Harper’s Bazaar Suit, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02 
/14/fashion-week-2012-unpaid-internships_n_1274181.html.  
145 Wang’s co-plaintiffs worked for Hearst publications including Cosmopolitan, Marie Claire, 
Esquire, Redbook, and Seventeen. Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 491–92. The interns worked in varying 
capacities including as a bookings intern, editorial intern, fashion intern, sales intern, and beauty intern. 
Id. at 491. 
146 Hines, supra note 144. Wang reportedly carried out menial tasks with little to no supervision. 
Id. She worked long hours and if something went wrong, Wang took the blame. Id. 
147 Id.; see also Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 491 (listing Wang’s duties as including functioning as a 
contact between editors and public relations representatives, conducting online research, cataloguing 
samples, maintaining the accessories closet, and creating story boards). 
148 Hines, supra note 144. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 492. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 492–93. 
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judgment based on the “immediate advantage” standard, arguing that 
Hearst received a direct benefit from the plaintiffs’ unpaid work.154 The 
plaintiffs argued in the alternative that Hearst failed to meet all of the 
criteria in the DOL’s Six-Factor Test.155 In opposition, the defendant 
argued for “a ‘balancing of the benefits test,’ which looks to the totality-of-
the-circumstances to evaluate the ‘economic reality’ of the relationship.”156 
Hearst disputed the plaintiffs’ contention that all of the elements of the 
DOL’s Six-Factor Test must be met, and further argued that judicial 
deference need not be afforded to the test, criticizing it as “a rigid 
checklist.”157 
Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York interpreted Walling’s 
totality-of-the-circumstances test to be controlling in determining whether 
the plaintiffs were “employees” under the FLSA and viewed the DOL Fact 
Sheet as merely a “framework for an analysis of the employee-employer 
relationship.”158 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reading of Walling, that 
the “presence of an immediate advantage alone creates an employment 
relationship,” stating that “[t]here is no one-dimensional test; rather, the 
prevailing view is the totality-of-the-circumstances.”159 The court cited 
support for its decision in a Second Circuit opinion affirming the totality-
of-the-circumstances test.160 
The district court in Wang avoided application of the totality-of-the-
circumstances test, stating that the competing standards argued by each 
side was enough to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the plaintiffs’ 
status as “employees,” and therefore denied the plaintiffs’ motion for 
partial summary judgment.161 The court further explained that applying the 
DOL Six-Factor Test presented a genuine dispute of material issues of fact 
with respect to the first, second, third, and fourth factors of the test,162 
based on which a reasonable jury might return a verdict favorable to 
                                                                                                                          
154 Id. at 493. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 494. 
157 Id. at 493. 
158 Id. at 493–94. 
159 Id. at 493. 
160 Id. (“[W]hether an employer-employee relationship exists does not depend on ‘isolated factors 
but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’” (quoting Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 
326 (2d Cir. 2012))). The Velez court further noted that a key consideration in the analysis depended on 
who received the primary benefits from the relationship. Velez, 693 F.3d at 330.  
161 Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 494.  
162 Id. at 494. First Factor: “The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in an educational environment.” 
DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. Second Factor: “The internship experience is for the benefit of the 
intern.” Id. Third Factor: “The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close 
supervision of existing staff.” Id. Fourth Factor: “The employer that provides the training derives no 
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern and on occasion its operations may actually be 
impeded.” Id. 
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Hearst, supporting denial of partial summary judgment.163   
Discussing the DOL Six-Factor Test, which the plaintiffs claimed the 
defendants failed to meet, the Wang court stated that the test was unclear 
regarding the appropriate weight to be given to each factor.164 Furthermore, 
the court stated that the introductory language of the DOL’s test is 
confusing as it suggests a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, stating 
that a determination of employment under the FLSA “depends upon all of 
the facts and circumstances of each such program.”165 In dicta, the court 
explained that despite the unclear application of the DOL’s Six-Factor 
Test, the test is entitled to some deference because the test was conceived 
by the WHD, which administers the FLSA, the federal law under which the 
plaintiffs brought suit.166 
Following the trial court’s decision, the plaintiffs in Wang filed an 
appeal to the Second Circuit, which was granted certiorari and will be 
heard jointly with Glatt, explained below.167 
B.  Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. 
One month after the Wang decision, Judge Pauley of the Southern 
District of New York decided the same issue of whether unpaid interns 
were “employees” under the FLSA in the case Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
Pictures, Inc.168 In Glatt the court expressly found that unpaid interns 
working on film production for various motion pictures “were classified 
improperly as unpaid interns and [were] ‘employees’ covered by the FLSA 
and NYLL.”169 Named plaintiff Eric Glatt worked on production of the 
film “Black Swan” in New York, pursuing his passion for entertainment.170 
Glatt had an MBA and was employed in the financial sector for years 
before deciding to change careers.171 After taking a film editing course and 
becoming certified, Glatt took the opportunity to work on a high budget 
film with hopes of realizing his dreams, but was instead assigned to the 
film’s accounting department.172 As an unpaid intern in the accounting 
                                                                                                                          
163 Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 494. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification due to lack 
of commonality among the policies or practices each magazine held with regard to interns. Id. The 
court adjourned the trial sine die. Id. at 498. 
164 Id. at 493. 
165 Id. (quoting DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8). 
166 Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493–94. The court cites United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 
(2001) for the proposition that “an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, 
given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information . . . and given the value of 
uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.” Id. at 494.  
167 Order Consolidating Appeals Dockets, supra note 139, at 2. 
168 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
169 Id. at 534. 
170 Id. at 522; Gardner, supra note 14.  
171 Gardner, supra note 14.  
172 Id.  
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department, Glatt was in charge of timesheets, analyzing reimbursements, 
and delivering paychecks, all without any compensation.173   
At trial, Glatt and his co-plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, 
alleging that they were “employees” under the FLSA and should have been 
compensated according to federal minimum wage requirements.174 While 
the plaintiffs argued that they fell outside of the Walling “trainee” 
exception, the trial court side-stepped this inquiry, stating that the issue had 
not been addressed by the Second Circuit.175 The defendant urged for the 
application of a primary benefit test, but the court disagreed, finding that 
the test had little support in Walling and criticizing the test as being 
“subjective and unpredictable,” making it an undesirable standard to 
apply.176   
The Glatt court found instead that the Six-Factor Test had support in 
Walling and was entitled to deference because it was promulgated by the 
WHD, the agency designated to administer the FLSA and its application.177 
In its analysis, the Glatt court applied all of the elements of the DOL’s Six-
Factor Test, but emphasized that the test required the consideration of all 
circumstances, with no single factor controlling.178 Applying the DOL Six-
Factor Test, the court found that: (1) the plaintiffs generally did not receive 
formal training or education during their internships;179 (2) Fox Searchlight 
Pictures Inc. was the primary beneficiary of the relationship because it 
received the benefit of unpaid work that they would have otherwise had to 
pay regular employees for;180 (3) the plaintiffs displaced regular employees 
because without the plaintiffs performing the tasks for free, a paid 
employee would have been needed to carry out the same duties;181 (4) Fox 
                                                                                                                          
173 Id.  
174 Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 530–31. 
175 Id. at 531. 
176 Id. at 531–32. “Under [the primary beneficiary] test, an employer could never know in advance 
whether it would be required to pay its interns. Such a standard is unmanageable.” Id. at 532. 
177 Id. at 532. While both Wang and Glatt note the deferential value of the WHD’s opinion, as the 
enforcement arm of the FLSA, Glatt seems to give more deference to the WHD than Wang, which 
stated that the DOL Six-Factor Test, though entitled to deference, was simply a “framework for an 
analysis.” Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493–94. 
178 Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532. 
179 See id. at 532–33 (stating that while the record for Glatt was unclear on the first factor, his co-
plaintiff Alexander Footman conclusively did not receive formal training or education during his 
internship and that learning through the experience was not enough).  
180 Id. at 533 (finding that benefits including résumé improvement, job references, and knowledge 
of the workings of a production office are incidental to working in the office, in either a paid or unpaid 
capacity, and are not related to academic or vocational training, as the WHD envisioned in this factor of 
the DOL test).  
181 Id. (finding that the plaintiffs carried out routine tasks that the defendant would have otherwise 
had to pay a regular employee to perform). These “routine tasks” included gathering documents for 
personnel files, picking up paychecks, and collecting managers’ signatures. Id. Glatt’s supervisor stated 
on the record that had Glatt not performed the duties he was assigned was an unpaid intern, another 
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Searchlight conceded that it received an immediate advantage from the 
plaintiffs’ work because otherwise, their tasks would have been performed 
by paid employees and the defendant’s business was never impeded by the 
plaintiffs;182and (5) the plaintiffs knew they were not entitled to jobs at the 
end of their internships and understood that the internships were unpaid.183 
After analyzing all six parts of the DOL Six-Factor Test, the Glatt 
court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the interns 
were misclassified and were in fact employees under the FLSA.184 Among 
the factors the court considered were that the interns performed the work of 
paid employees, provided an immediate advantage to the employer, 
performed basic tasks that did not provide educational or technical 
training, and any benefits that the interns received were not educational.185 
The court distinguished Glatt from Walling, in which the “trainees 
impeded the regular business of the employer, worked only in their own 
interest, and provided no advantage to the employer.”186  
Both the Wang and Glatt courts utilized the “totality of circumstances” 
test and the DOL’s Six-Factor Test, but weighed each standard differently. 
Whereas the Wang court found the totality-of-the-circumstances test to be 
controlling and viewed the DOL’s Six-Factor Test as merely an added 
framework for analysis, Glatt applied the DOL Six-Factor Test as its 
primary analytical tool and supplemented with the totality of circumstances 
analysis, rejecting the primary beneficiary test.   
Wang and Glatt, illustrate the federal courts’ varying interpretations of 
the FLSA based on the Walling decision and the DOL Six-Factor Test, and 
the glaring need for a uniform standard. On November 26, 2013, a Second 
Circuit panel agreed to hear appeals for Wang and Glatt jointly.187 Given 
the varying tests applied in each case, one of the two questions on appeal is 
a clarification of the appropriate legal standard for determining whether an 
unpaid intern is an “employee” entitled to minimum wage under the 
FLSA.188   
 
 
                                                                                                                          
paid production assistant or regular staff member would have had to work overtime to complete the 
tasks. Id.    
182 Id. at 534. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Order Consolidating Appeals Dockets, supra note 139, at 2. 
188 Plaintiffs-Respondents’ Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal at 4–5, Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 13-4481 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2013). 
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VI.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
With the Second Circuit Court of Appeals having jointly taken up the 
appeals in Wang and Glatt,189 some guidance on the issue of the intern-
employee distinction is likely on the horizon. Considering the statutory, 
legislative, and judicial history discussed above, there are two operating 
principles that courts and legislatures should consider when resolving 
questions about unpaid internships under the FLSA. Among the factors 
that courts should take into account when proposing a new standard are the 
competing and mutually dependent interests of employers and interns. A 
careful balancing of employers’ need for predictability in avoiding legal 
liability and interns’ need for protection from being taken advantage of is 
necessary to reach a workable solution for the legal and industrial 
communities as well as students and prospective interns. 
A.  Predictability for Employers 
Court decisions based on varying tests severely impede employers’ 
ability to predict liability. Using different tests to determine whether 
interns are “employees” under the FLSA poses a challenge to businesses 
that rely on predictability, uniformity, and efficiency. These circuit court 
tests are controlling only within those courts’ jurisdictions and do not bind 
employers across the nation. This contributes to employers’ inability to 
apply the appropriate legal standard and construct lawful internship 
programs. While many have sought advise from law firms on steps to take 
to avoid liability,190 judicial establishment of a uniform test is necessary to 
ensure consistent application of the FLSA with regard to the employment 
status of unpaid interns. 
Some lower courts have considered the employer’s ability to predict 
liability for providing unlawful unpaid internships in determining which 
test to use in analyzing whether an intern is an “employee” under the 
FLSA. For example, in Glatt, the trial court found that the “primary 
benefit” test was unmanageable because employers could not determine in 
advance whether to pay their interns because of the unpredictable and 
subjective nature of the primary benefit inquiry.191   
Employers found to be in willful violation of the FLSA open 
themselves up to prosecution by the Attorney General and fines of up to 
                                                                                                                          
189 Ben James, Labor and Employment Cases to Watch in 2015, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/601418/labor-and-employment-cases-to-watch-in-2015.  
190 E.g., Jeff P. Dunlaevy, “Research Me a Cup of Coffee and a Cinnamon Scone!”: Unpaid 
Internships Pose Major Legal Risks, but Are Law Firms Exempt?, 25 S.C. LAW. 44, 48 (2014) 
(suggesting guidelines to assist law firms and other private employers in establishing legally compliant 
internship programs). 
191 Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.  
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$10,000 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both.192 Interns who are 
found to be “employees” are entitled to damages including back wages 
liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, as well as appropriate equitable relief, 
the boundaries of which are undefined.193 Such liability has the potential of 
being financially taxing, particularly for employers faced with class action 
lawsuits, in which payouts multiply depending on the number of plaintiff 
interns.194 The cost of legal liability for unpaid internships has become 
apparent in the recent settlements that have been reached in class action 
complaints filed by interns, which in one case amounted to a total of $6.4 
million.195 
Without reliable legal standards to determine the legality of unpaid 
internships, businesses and employers who would otherwise provide 
opportunities for unpaid internships have a strong incentive to discontinue 
their programs.196 Conversely, if some employers value their internship 
programs enough to continue providing them, but are overly cautious and 
risk-averse, they may convert all of their unpaid internship positions to 
paid internships, when it might not be necessary to do so. While some have 
recommended employers adopt such an approach,197 the over-provision of 
paid internships will contribute to an extra cost for businesses, undoubtedly 
stunting companies’ rate of growth and discouraging the provision of 
internships all together or providing fewer internships opportunities. The 
potential discontinuation or lessening of internships can be avoided by 
providing clarity in the law, specifically by way of a test that can be easily 
applied by businesses. 
                                                                                                                          
192 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (2012). 
193 Id. §§ 216(a)–(b). Alternatively, interns can file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor who 
has authority to bring legal action against employers and recover similar damages to backpay, other 
equitable damages, and attorney’s fees. Id. § 216(c). 
194 See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[E]mployers are 
governed . . . by the demands of the market place and by their own specialized needs.”); see also 
Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Court Approves Condé Nast $5.85 Mln Intern Pay Settlement, REUTERS (Dec. 
29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/29/condenast-interns-idUSL1N0UD1LE20141229 
(stating that the settlement applies to roughly 7,500 interns who had worked for defendant’s magazines 
and each of the former interns who worked at Condé Nast from June 2007 to the present are expected 
to receive payments ranging from $700 to $1,900 each).  
195 E.g., Daniel Miller, NBCUniversal to Settle Suit by Former Interns for $6.4 Million, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-81764733/ (stating that 
NBCUniversial agreed to settle a class action lawsuit with thousands of interns claiming they should 
have been paid for their work). 
196 See NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, UNPAID INTERNSHIPS: A SURVEY OF THE NACE 
MEMBERSHIP 4, 5 (2010) (stating that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test has likely caused “a chilling effect on 
all internships because employers [are] frightened by the increased scrutiny”).  
197 See Keleher, supra note 14, at 628 (suggesting the best way for employers to avoid legal 
liability is to treat all interns as employees and pay them the minimum wage).  
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B.  Protection for Interns  
The divide between the courts and the DOL has created a “legal void” 
in which interns are neither volunteers exempt from the FLSA, nor 
employees protected by the FLSA.198 Some suggest that recent cases such 
as Wang and Glatt have revealed a larger trend in the business community 
of mislabeling individuals to evade obligations under the FLSA.199 In this 
case, since the term “intern” is not included in the FLSA, employers 
labeling positions as “internships” would fall outside the regulatory void of 
the WHD. In Walling, the Court warned of such evasions and stated that 
one of the FLSA’s purposes is to increase opportunities for gainful 
employment.200 Internships, both paid and unpaid, are an important vehicle 
in today’s job market and often provide the necessary learning experience 
that employers frequently require.201 Internships also provide a learning 
and skill-building opportunity unavailable in the classroom setting.202 
The benefits of internships in today’s competitive job market puts 
employers in a position of power and renders interns vulnerable to 
exploitation and unwilling to voice concerns regarding abuses of power.203 
Furthermore, businesses are in a position of power with respect to 
internships because the majority of for-profit employers will stay in 
business without them.204 
C.  Totality of Economic Circumstances Test Should be Applied  
In deciding whether an unpaid internship is legal under the FLSA, the 
three bodies of law regarding the employment status of internships (the 
FLSA, Walling, and the DOL Fact Sheet) illustrate a common concern for 
determining who benefits economically from the business relationship in 
the internship setting.205 Many of the tests used by courts have been 
                                                                                                                          
198 David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 245 
(2002). 
199 See James, supra note 189 (referencing a growing trend among businesses to evade FLSA 
obligations). 
200 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151 (1947). 
201 Gregory, supra note 16, at 241.  
202 See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(describing testimony of alumni that the leadership skills and work ethic developed through the 
school’s practical training program was “highly valuable in their future endeavors”).  
203 Peter W. Fulham, Unpaid Interns and Labor Laws: Gaining Experience, Enduring Abuse, 
POL. DAILY (May 12, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/12/unpaid-interns-labor-laws-
students-experience-abuse/ (recounting instances of interns expressing reluctance to report abuses in 
order to maintain good relationships with employers).  
204 Mazurak, supra note 36, at 118. 
205 See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc. 473 F. Supp. 465, 476 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) 
(determining that X-ray technicians-in-training enrolled in a two-year accredited college program were 
employees because the defendant benefited economically from the work performed by the trainees by 
charging patients at full rates). 
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criticized as being subjective and overly rigid, thereby preventing the 
courts from applying an analysis tailored to varying internship 
structures.206 While some have advocated for a totality-of-the-
circumstances test that complies with Walling,207 such a test would provide 
an employer with little guidance on how to structure an internship program 
capable of satisfying this subjective approach. The totality-of-the-
circumstances test, while referenced by both the WHD in the DOL Six-
Factor Test and Walling, requires a framework with which to analyze the 
entirety of the circumstances. The economic realities test provides such a 
framework and has support in judicial precedent.  
The totality-of-the-economic-circumstances test analyzes the entirety 
of the circumstances when determining the economic realities of a 
relationship. The proper test for unpaid internships should be whether: (1) 
the worker is not independent and receives constant direction and 
supervision, and (2) the worker is receiving academic credit or other 
tangible benefits for the internship. Under the proposed test, if these factors 
are not met while taking into consideration the totality of the 
circumstances, the intern must be paid.  
These factors have significant support in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Though federal circuit courts are split regarding the use of the economic 
realities test,208 the Supreme Court has twice indicated a preference for the 
economic realities test.209 First, in Rutherford, the Supreme Court 
effectively added the totality of circumstances analysis to the economic 
realities test, thereby establishing the totality-of-the-economic-
circumstances-test.210 Second, in Goldberg, the Supreme Court applied the 
economic realities test but failed to state that the test was the primary 
                                                                                                                          
206 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that the 
primary benefit test is “subjective and unpredictable” and “unmanageable” for employers); Solis, 642 
F.3d at 525 (stating that the all-or-nothing approach is “overly rigid”). 
207 Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Note, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to Determining 
Whether Interns Are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 769–
71 (2015).  
208 Compare Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1982) (omitting the 
economic realities test from its analysis of the status of trainees as employees), with Reich v. Parker 
Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that the court must evaluate the 
economic reality of the relationship between the employer and the individual).  
209 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); Rutherford Food Corp. 
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947).  
210 Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730–31 (affirming the Tenth Circuit’s application of the economic 
realities test but stating that the determination depends on the circumstances of the whole activity). 
Such a test is patently different from a balancing-economic-advantages-test proposed by some. See 
Natalie Bacon, Unpaid Internships: The History, Policy, and Future Implications of “Fact Sheet #71,” 
6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 67, 92 (2011) (proposing adopting a test balancing the 
economic advantages of parties, which would compare the experience received by the intern and the 
benefit the employer received from the internship through a comparison of the per-hour cost to the 
employer of the intern and the per-hour benefit to the employer of an intern). 
 2015] THE LEGAL VOID OF UNPAID INTERNSHIPS     1213 
vehicle for determining the employment status of an intern.211 Lower 
courts have since repeatedly found that whether an individual is an 
employee or not is determined by the “economic realities” of the potential 
employment situation, which requires consideration of the totality-of-the 
circumstances.212   
The economic realities test would more accurately assess the legality 
of unpaid internship programs. Goldberg’s economic realities test requires 
consideration of functional aspects of a potential employment relationship, 
including the worker’s independence, the method of compensation, and the 
principal’s authority over the worker as opposed to technical concepts.213 
The worker’s independence implies the requirement of supervision and the 
compensation method should include assessing whether the internship is 
for course credit or simply provides “soft skills” benefits, which can be 
learned at any job.214 This test suggests that the greater control the 
employer has the greater the likelihood that the intern is an employee under 
the FLSA.  
The factors in the proposed test are supported by the WHD in favoring 
internship programs that provide a “classroom or academic experience,” as 
the WHD views such opportunities as an extension of the intern’s 
education.215 However, simply stating that the experience should be similar 
to training that would be provided in an educational environment does not 
ensure that the desired standard will be met. More guidance is required as 
to what a sufficient educational environment entails. The first factor of the 
proposed test, that the worker is not independent and receives constant 
direction and supervision provides a two-fold benefit. First, it provides 
guidance for the employer regarding what resources are required in order 
to provide a classroom-like experience, satisfying the first part of the DOL 
Six-Factor Test. Second, it ensures that an unpaid intern does not displace 
an otherwise paid worker, satisfying the third part of the DOL Six-Factor 
Test. The first prong also engages in an analysis of the economic realities 
of the relationship, ensuring that the intern’s work is not being used to save 
                                                                                                                          
211 Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33 (conditionally holding that the individuals were employees “if the 
‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the test of employment” (citations omitted)). 
212 See, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 329–30 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying the economic 
reality test to determine the employment relationship of a domestic worker under the FLSA); Solis v. 
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that whether an 
employment relationship exists depends on the economic reality as determined on a case-by-case basis 
considering the surrounding circumstances); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 531–
32, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering “all of the circumstances” to determine which party benefited 
more and assessing whether the economic reality favored the existence of an employment relationship). 
213 Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33. 
214 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that 
benefits such as résumé improvements, job references, and understanding the workings of an office are 
incidental to working in an office, regardless of the nature of the relationship).  
215 DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8; 1996 OPINION LETTER, supra note 51, at *1. 
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on the cost of hiring a paid worker, thereby allowing the employer to 
benefit unjustly. In Walling, the Court looked favorably upon the railroad 
company’s supervision over the trainees when determining that the trainees 
did not displace regularly paid workers and were not employees.216  
The second prong of the proposed test, that the unpaid intern be 
provided academic credit or other tangible benefits, addresses the DOL 
Six-Factor Test’s first part—of receiving training that would be given in an 
educational environment—and the second part, which concerns the 
internship experience being for the benefit of the intern.217   
The proposed test, while not fool-proof, does have precedential support 
in Walling and the DOL’s Six-Factor Test and provides for a fact-based 
inquiry allowing all parties to easily determine whether the internship falls 
outside of the confines of the FLSA’s definition of “employee.” Interns 
who are given clerical work without supervision, even when receiving 
academic credit or tangible benefits, will be able to determine when they 
are being used for productive work that is not academic in nature, allowing 
them to assert their rights and demand fair treatment. Similarly, employers 
using this guidance will be able to structure unpaid internship programs to 
ensure constant supervision similar to that in the academic environment 
and that the intern is receiving a tangible benefit that will provide skills 
useful in their career trajectories if the student is not receiving academic 
credit. Finally, the proposed test allows courts to engage in a fact intensive 
inquiry while still providing some flexibility through a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Unpaid internships are a nationally prevalent and span various 
industries, necessitating a uniform legal standard for assessing their 
legality under the FLSA. The totality-of-the-economic-circumstances test 
is such a standard. It provides employer predictability, protects interns 
against exploitation, and accounts for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the FLSA and the DOL’s guidance. The economic realities test, assessed in 
light of the total circumstances of the situation, is a fact-based test relying 
on the functional aspects of an internship, allowing for a clearer and more 
comprehensive standard for businesses, interns, and courts to apply. In 
considering the appeal of the Glatt and Wang cases, the Second Circuit 
should strongly consider the totality-of-the-economic-circumstances test as 
an applicable standard that is favorable to all parties involved in current 
and future litigation concerning unpaid internships under the FLSA.  
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